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Abstract
Various studies report that patients with dense amnesia experience difficulties in 
simulating future events. It is argued that this resembles an inability to remember past 
episodes in that both indicate a deficit in mental scene construction. Such findings, 
however, rely upon  content-based analyses of participants’ verbal reports. Here, 
samples of verbal reports produced by hippocampal-damaged participants are 
subjected to a qualitative, discourse analysis of how participants and researchers 
negotiated the status of these reports. This shows that failure in mental scene 
construction can be viewed as an interactional achievement rather than the mere 
reporting of mental events. A multi-disciplinary perspective which combines 
qualitative analysis with other forms of analytic technique may explain subtle 
differences between hippocampal-damaged participants and control participants. 
Key words episodic memory; simulation of future events; hippocampus; discourse 
analysis; interaction
Imaging the future
3
1. Introduction
The rapid expansion of clinical neuropsychology in educational, clinical and 
professional domains has brought with it a complementary expansion in both theory 
and method as they apply to this field. One important methodological technique is the
collection of data elicited in the form of verbal reports produced by both patients and 
control subjects. Such reports are routinely analyzed by the deployment of delineated 
scoring techniques in which verbal content is categorized by means of coding 
strategies, and the subsequent output subjected to quantitative analyses. This 
methodological approach is an important tool, because it provides the researcher with 
the means of gathering information from participants that is rich, complex, and 
reflective of participants’ own experiences. Moreover, the deployment of coding 
schemes and quantitative analyses enables the researcher to ensure that studies are 
well designed, properly executed and that their data are subjected to objective forms 
of analysis.
However, contemporary research in areas of study outwith clinical 
neuropsychology (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008) reveal that verbal material of this sort 
is also amenable to other, more qualitative, forms of analysis. This raises the 
possibility that inter-disciplinary research, in which a mixture of different analytic 
techniques is deployed, may provide a methodological approach which offers new 
insights into how to make sense of verbal material of this sort. It is this possibility 
which is explored in the present paper. Specifically, the aim here is to take the very 
first steps in an exploration of whether the use of qualitative forms of analysis might 
provide clinical psychologists with additional means of making sense of their data.
To pursue this goal, the present paper draws upon a previously published 
clinical neuropsychology study, in which participants’ verbal reports were collected 
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(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 2007). It is important to state at the outset that 
the present paper is not intended as a criticism of the Hassabis et al. study itself, nor 
of the use of verbal reports within the field of neuropsychology in general. Rather, the 
aim here is to establish the extent to which qualitative analyses of the verbal reports 
reproduced in that paper may represent a useful methodological adjunct to more 
traditional forms of analyses. There are several reasons for selecting this particular 
previous study. Firstly, the authors were thorough enough to include in their published 
work specific examples of the verbal reports they collected from their participants. 
Second, this study is recent and has proven to be influential within the field. Third, the 
rigorous methodological and analytic approach adopted within this study (including 
the precise scoring system based on Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 
2002) provides an excellent background against which the potential contributions, if 
any, of more qualitative forms of analyses might be judged.
Before outlining how such an inter-disciplinary approach might proceed, it is 
useful to consider very briefly the theoretical and empirical background which gave 
rise to the Hassabis et al. study. Patients with dense amnesia have been reported 
presenting with difficulties envisaging their future or simulating future events (Klein, 
Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Rosenbaum, McKinnon, Levine, & Moscovitch, 2004; see 
also Rosenbaum, Kohler, Schacter, Moscovitch, Westmacott, et al., 2005, Tulving, 
2005; Buckner & Carroll, 2006; and Hassabis et al., 2007). This led Schacter and co-
workers (e.g. Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007; Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007), among others, to argue that imagining future episodes 
shares similarities with remembering past episodes, and others, including Buckner and 
Carroll (2006), and Maguire and co-workers (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; 
Hassabis & Maguire; Hassabis et al., 2007), to maintain that scene construction 
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constitutes a common process underlying both episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking.
In both episodic memory retrieval and episodic future thinking, contextual (i.e. 
time and place relevant) details should be reported. Therefore, patients with episodic 
memory deficits should also show a deficit in imagining future episodes, since their 
inability to ‘conjure up’ details in the absence of cues should also affect prospective 
imagining (for a recent discussion see Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2008). 
In considering the relationship between the amnesia and ability to imagine 
new experiences, Hassabis et al (2007) have presented evidence which suggests that 
people with hippocampal lesions are worse than control participants at evoking and 
reporting imaginary events. As a consequence, they argue that:  ‘… the critical 
attribute determining whether internally generated experiences, either real or 
imaginary, are hippocampal-dependent may be the extent to which they are vividly 
(re)-experienced.’ (Hassabis et al., p.1729).
Hassabis et al. compared the performance of dense amnesic male participants 
with primary damage to the hippocampi on a specific task with that of ten healthy 
control male participants. The task required participants to imagine new experiences 
and to provide verbal reports of these to the researcher. Commonplace settings were 
selected as the scenarios for these imagined experiences. The procedure involved the 
researcher reading aloud a short description, such as ‘Imagine you’re lying on a white 
sandy beach in a beautiful tropical bay’, and asking participants to vividly imagine the 
scene. Hassibis et al note that this sort of visualization of experiences ‘within a rich 
spatial setting’ differs from the sorts of simpler imagery which might be associated 
with tasks such as visualizing simple objects. This distinction was given emphasis in 
the Hassabis et al study in that participants were asked to describe the imagined scene
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in as much multimodal detail as possible. Participants were told to give ‘free reign’ to 
their imaginations and were encouraged to visualize the situation being imagined as 
though they themselves were physically present in that setting. The verbal description 
concluded when the participant felt that he had reached a natural end or felt that there 
was nothing else he could add. During the process of verbal description, the 
researcher made use of a ‘probing protocol’ which comprised questions designed to 
elicit further description or elaboration. Participants’ verbal reports were recorded and 
then transcribed. 
Subsequently, these transcriptions were subjected to a range of quantitative 
scoring techniques. The first of these, a measure of ‘content’, used categorical coding 
of the reports based on a set of researcher-defined categorisations. These 
categorizations coded verbal utterances into one of four classes: sensory descriptions, 
spatial references, entities present, and thoughts, emotions, and actions. The number 
of instances of each category was then calculated for each participant. In addition, 
quantitative ratings were also collected from participants to assess perceived sense of 
presence and salience of the imagined scene. Participants also reported on the 
perceived spatial coherence of their experiences. They were presented with a set of 
possible descriptors of their experiences which varied in the extent to which the 
experience was described as having been coherent. Based on the specific descriptors 
which participants selected, a quantitative spatial coherence index for each participant 
was then calculated. Finally, scorers estimated, on a scale of 0 – 10, the overall 
quality of the description provided. These different scores were then combined into an 
overall ‘experiential index’ which was intended to measure the overall richness of the 
imagined experience. Based upon these quantitative analyses, Hassabis et al. conclude 
that the verbal reports produced by participants with hippocampal damage evidence 
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impaired abilities to imagine new experiences and to combine elements of description 
in the process of mental scene construction (see also Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).
So contemporary trends in the study of the role of the hippocampus in memory 
suggest that it is important in the proper functioning of episodic memory, and that this 
is explained by the iconic or visual nature of such memories. Because of this, the 
argument has also been made that other aspects of cognition which apparently involve 
visual processing such as (re-)creating imaginary events may similarly prove to be 
hippocampal dependent. 
However, it is noteworthy that this recent appeal to evidence drawn from 
studies in which patients with hippocampal amnesia are asked to imagine events and 
then describe them verbally relies upon the researcher providing an analytic overview 
of the nature and quality of these verbal reports. It is at this point, then, that the 
considerations of inter-disciplinary methodology outlined at the start of this paper 
become relevant. In particular, given the importance of verbal reports in this field, it is 
worthwhile considering whether there are potential benefits in adopting a more multi-
disciplinary approach which utilises forms of analysis that go beyond content-based 
methods. 
In pursuing this line of thought, it is useful to note that a number of 
researchers from outwith the neuroscience community have explored the ways in 
which talk and text can be understood through the application of discourse analysis 
techniques. The focal point of discourse analysis is the study of language in use. 
From this perspective, ‘discourse is viewed as a phenomenon which has its own 
properties, properties which have an impact on people and their social interaction. 
One important aspect of this approach is to emphasize the way in which participants 
themselves have an at least implicit understanding that discourse has these properties’
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(McKinlay & McVittie, p.8). So whereas content-based analytic techniques treat the 
verbal reports produced by participants as straightforward representations of what is 
being visualised, discourse analysis seeks to identify the precise ways in which such 
reports are built up as descriptive accounts through the careful deployment of a 
variety of discursive features. 
The aim of the present paper is, then, to explore the extent to which a 
discourse analysis-based approach may contribute to an understanding of the 
descriptive accounts produced by participants in neuroscientific research. In this 
respect, the present paper seeks to establish whether a multi-disciplinary approach 
which draws on a range of different analytic techniques may prove useful to 
researchers within this field.
2. Method
2.1 Materials & Participants
The materials used in the present study are drawn from three verbal reports produced 
by amnesiacs and made available by Hassabis et al. (2007). Here we take these three 
verbal reports and subject them to a re-analysis using discourse analytic techniques. In 
offering this re-analysis, we aim to demonstrate the insights into participants’ verbal 
reports that a fine-grained analysis of talk might offer beyond those provided by 
content-based analytic approaches. In this respect, the qualitative analysis provided 
here is intended not as a theoretical critique of the findings reported by Hassabis et al. 
Rather, the point of this re-analysis is to explore whether the introduction of inter-
disciplinary methodologies is a useful tactic in this field. In particular, it is important 
to note that the present re-analysis focuses solely on three extracts which Hassabis 
and colleagues made available.  While this is, of course, an insufficient sample from 
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which to draw theoretical conclusions, it is a sufficient basis upon which to evaluate 
the potential usefulness of a mixed-methodology approach which draws in part on
discourse analytic techniques. Of course, the corpus of verbal material from which 
Hassabis et al drew their examples is much larger, and so their participants will have 
said other things at other times. But in a sense this is irrelevant, because the point of 
this present example is to examine what, in fact, these particular participants said at 
these particular times. Indeed, the suggestion here is that if a qualitative analysis of 
such an extremely limited sub-set of data throws up interesting findings, then the 
potential for more large-scale studies of a similar sort is all the greater.
The three descriptive extracts originally presented in Hassabis et al. were 
responses from three participants with primary damage to the hippocampus to one or 
other of three different scenarios. The three scenarios were:
 Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach in a beautiful tropical 
bay
 Imagine that you are standing in the main hall of a museum containing 
many exhibits
 Imagine that you are standing in the middle of a bustling street market
In this study, verbal reports from three of the participants taking part in the 
original Hassabis et al study are examined. The three participants, P03, P04 and P05, 
were all male and were aged 24, 58 and 70 respectively. Clinical investigations had 
established that in all three cases, the participants had limbic encephalitis. In all three 
cases, tests revealed that the participants displayed impairment on anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia.
2.2 Procedure
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The extracts presented here were examined by means of discourse analysis. The term 
‘discourse analysis’ does not describe a single method but rather has been used by a 
range of authors to refer to a range of different approaches, each with their own 
interests and concerns. (A review of these different approaches can be found in 
McKinlay & McVittie, 2008.) This range can usefully be viewed as a spectrum of 
methodological approaches. At one end of this spectrum, researchers focus on 
discourse understood in its broadest sense as routinized forms of communication 
which are influenced by ideological or structural features of society. The research 
emphasis here is to provide a critical account of the way in which society constrains 
or regulates how people make sense of their own and others’ places in society (e.g. 
the role of racist or sexist discourses) and commonly to challenge discourse that 
sustains social inequalities. At the other end of the spectrum, researchers focus on 
discourse in a quite different way. Here, the researcher’s interest lies in the way that 
people use discourse in their interactions with others in everyday life. From this 
perspective, the emphasis is on the sequential ordering of conversations and on the 
fine-grain detail of how discrete episodes of talk are designed in order to accomplish 
specific social actions which are relevant to the immediate interactional context.
In the present study, analysis was conducted using the latter approach outlined 
above. This form of analysis offered two particular advantages in the present case. 
First, it allowed attention to focus on the interactions themselves between 
experimenters and patients with hippocampal lesions. The focus, in line with the aim 
of this study, thus was on the ways in which these individuals negotiated the adequacy 
or inadequacy of the descriptions in the immediate context of the experimental 
setting.  Second, it addresses what might otherwise be seen as a potential shortcoming 
in analyses of this sort: that such analyses lack validity and are grounded in mere 
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subjective interpretation. By paying careful and detailed attention to what is actually 
said, the analyst can demonstrate how particular elements of the interaction are 
relevant not just for the analyst but also can be shown to be relevant to the individuals 
themselves through the ways in which the interaction proceeds. The reader, by virtue 
of having available both the analyses and the data upon which they are based, is 
consequently in a position to evaluate the analyses that are offered. 
In the present case, consistent with this approach, the three extracts drawn 
from Hassabis et al were read and then re-read on a number of occasions. The purpose 
of this re-reading process is to allow the analysts to become exhaustively familiar 
with what is being said in order to direct analytic focus onto the question of how the 
speaker produces his or her utterance. In general, this involves the analyst in 
becoming progressively aware of the subtle means by which speakers ‘design’ their 
utterances, such as the selection of particular lexical items or larger elements of 
speech including descriptive phrases, metaphors, contrasts, generalizations (or 
particularizations), or lists. At the same time, the analyst attends to the question of 
how such elements of speech are combined to produce particular descriptions of 
people, actions and events that might, or might not, be rhetorically persuasive.  
In this particular case, this process was focused on identifying those areas of 
talk in which participants and researchers themselves treated the descriptive accounts 
being produced as though they were appropriate or not. In coding the data, therefore, 
particular attention was paid to identifying those elements of speech which 
participants deployed in order to ‘negotiate’ with each other in an ongoing fashion 
whether or not the descriptive account currently being produced would ‘count’ as 
being appropriate. Thus, for example, analytic coding paid particular attention to 
specific phrases which were apparently produced in order to establish that the 
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description being provided was derived from first-hand knowledge and was therefore 
especially trustworthy. Attention similarly was paid to questions which were 
apparently designed to achieve the opposite effect by putting in doubt the usefulness 
of the description that was offered. Analysis thereafter focused on the effects of these 
strategies, particularly upon whether or not participants’ descriptions were treated as 
providing sufficient detail of the scenes in question and the consequences of 
acceptance or rejection for the interaction that followed.
3. Results
The first extract to be examined was a response by amnesic patient P03 to a cue from 
the researcher which asked him to imagine himself lying on a beach (researcher’s 
utterances represented in italic text).
Extract 1
Cue: Imagine you are lying on a white sandy beach in a beautiful tropical bay
PO3: As for seeing I can’t really apart from just sky. I can hear the sound of seagulls 
and of the sea … um … I can feel the grains of sand between my fingers … 
um … I can hear one of those ship’s hooters (laughter) … um … that’s about 
it. Are you’re actually seeing this in your mind’s eye? No, the only thing I can 
see is blue. So if you look around what can you see? Really all I can see is the 
colour of the blue sky and the white sand, the rest of it, the sounds and things, 
obviously I’m just hearing. Can you see anything else? No, it’s like I’m kind 
of floating…
(Hassabis et al, 2007, p. 1727)
In Extract 1, P03 begins by stating that he can see the sky. In other 
circumstances, P03’s claim to see only sky might have been treated as adequate, in 
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that someone lying on a beach might well be taken to be looking upwards at the sky. 
However, P03 himself prefaces his response by problematizing his account in
describing himself as unable to see ‘really’. 
P03 goes on to provide a description of his imagined experience in terms of a 
three-part listing of its descriptive features. Three part lists of this sort are often 
included in descriptions in order to summarize some more general class of things 
(Potter, 1996), indicating that there is a larger set of items which the speaker could in 
principle draw upon in framing the relevant description. But in the present case, P03
himself precludes that normative inference by indicating that the three elements of his 
description exhaust the range of features which are available, in saying that ‘that’s 
about it’.
The researcher’s subsequent questions are designed is a specific way. They 
emphasise the visual aspects of P03’s experience to the exclusion of other properties 
such as properties of sound or touch. There are two interesting aspects of this design. 
Firstly, it is interesting to note that this emphasis on visual experience is in apparent 
contradiction to the researcher’s original instructions, which emphasised the 
multimodal aspect of imagination. Secondly, the researcher’s questions explicitly 
require P03 to respond with details of what he sees, despite P03’s admission at the 
beginning of his account that he cannot really see anything. In this way, the details 
which P03 has already provided in terms of what he can hear and touch are in effect 
discounted.
Moreover, P03 frames his responses to the researcher’s questions as though 
they are insufficient, by indicating that he can ‘only’ see blue and that the colour of 
the blue sky and the white sand are ‘all he can see’. This joint working up of the 
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insufficiency of P03’s visual experience then provides a local context which 
downgrades imaginings which come from modalities other than vision. 
Thus, although there are details in the account which might persuasively point 
to events occurring in the mind’s eye (or in the mind’s ‘ear’ or in the mind’s 
‘fingertips’) P03 himself undermines this provision of detail as a satisfactory account, 
and both the participant and the researcher orient to what is said by the participant as 
an inadequate account.
In the second extract, participant P05 responds to a request to imagine himself 
standing in a museum.
Extract 2
Cue: Imagine that you are standing in the main hall of a museum containing many 
exhibits
P05: [pause] There’s not a lot as it happens. So what does it look like in your 
imagined scene? Well, there’s big doors. The openings would be high, so the 
doors would be very big with brass handles, the ceiling would be made of 
glass, so there’s plenty of light coming through. Huge room, exit on either side
of the room, there’s a pathway and map through the centre and on either side 
there’d be the exhibits [pause] I don’t know what they are [pause] … there’d 
be people [pause] To be honest there’s not a lot coming. Do you hear anything 
or smell anything? No, it’s not very real. It’s just not happening. My 
imagination isn’t … well, I’m not imagining it. Let’s put it that way. Normally 
you can picture it can’t you? I’m not picturing anything at the moment. So are 
you seeing anything at all? No.
(Hassabis et al, 2007, p. 1727)
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A first thing to note about P05’s account is that it has similarities to that 
produced by P03. The description P05 provides could, in other contexts, be regarded 
as appropriate. Like P03, he provides a listing of descriptive features which is, if 
anything, even more extensive than that offered by P03. Nevertheless, like P03, P05
prefaces his description by problematizing it, in saying that ‘there is not a lot as it 
happens’ and concludes his initial response by downgrading it with ‘To be honest, 
there’s not a lot coming’.
Moreover, the prompt from the researcher makes relevant potential elements 
of the imagined scene which have not by that stage been addressed in the account 
provided by P05, namely what is heard or smelt. This is similar to the case with P03, 
in which the description on offer is treated as being not appropriately multi-modal and 
hence lacking in elements of ‘scene construction’. In P03’s case, he reported being 
able to feel and hear things but was asked about what he could see. In P05’s case, he 
reports being able to see things but is asked what he can hear or smell.
The practical upshot of the researcher’s question ‘Do you hear anything or 
smell anything’ is that P05 produces a negative response which is amplified by a 
further undermining of his own account. This creates an interactional context in which 
the researcher is in a position to introduce a question which indicates the insufficiency 
of P05’s account. The question ‘So are you seeing anything at all?’ makes available 
the inference that, to date, what P05 has said indicates that he is not seeing anything 
and this is represented (through the use of ‘So’) as a conclusion which can be drawn 
from the interaction to date. The strength of this conclusion is emphasised through the 
researcher’s use of ‘at all’ which implies that P05 has, to date, described nothing 
which counts as being ‘seen’.
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This local interactional context is one in which P05’s eventual negative 
response to the question can be viewed as an appropriate one. In other contexts, P05’s 
‘No’ might be heard as contradicting what he said earlier in which he described 
various features of the museum. But in a context where that description is treated as 
insufficient, P05’s negative response can be heard as a locally relevant answer to the 
question offered. It is interesting to speculate about what the nature of the interaction 
would have been had the researcher asked different questions instead of ‘Do you hear 
anything or smell anything’ and ‘So are you seeing anything at all’. For example, if 
the question had been ‘Can you describe the doors/ceiling/people more’ P05’s 
response might have had a different character.
In the last extract, participant P04 produces a description of himself standing 
in a street market.
Example 3
Cue: Imagine that you are standing in the middle of a bustling street market
P04: Well, it shouldn’t be difficult for someone who has done it for 24 and a half 
years [here P04 is referring to his previous job of being a market trader - see 
Supplementary Methods online]. The surrounding is very pleasant, it’s a 
beautiful day. There’s no bad smells, there is no dirt, which is quite unusual. 
Everything seems to be okay, everything is pleasant. People seem to be quite 
well disposed and basically there is a sense of [pause] happiness. And if you 
look round what can you see? When I look around I see people, very many 
people. Most of all... um... not many men, all I see are young ladies. And 
basically they are all in a hurry, clearly, because they would only have so 
much time. And... it’s a precious moment. [pause] And what does this market 
look like? It could be almost any market, it could be St. Albans, it could be 
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Petticoat Lane, it could be the Roman Road on Saturday, it could be Leather 
Lane on a Friday, it could be Charter Street when the days were good. Okay, 
but what does it look like to you? Well, it could be a market in Milan. Markets 
have something in common which is magical and that magic can only be 
experienced by someone who appreciates that sort of thing. A market is a 
wonderful place, maybe not for everyone, but on a lovely day I think you’d 
find as much happiness there as anywhere.
(Hassabis et al, 2007, Supplementary material)
One immediately relevant feature of P04’s account is that it differs from those 
offered by P03 and P05 in that instead of undermining his description, P04 works to 
warrant it as an authentic account of what markets look like by positioning himself as 
an expert, in that he was a market trader for a number of years. This is reiterated 
towards the end of P04’s account where he indicates that the ‘magic’ of markets can 
only be properly experienced by particular types of people and by indicating that the 
wonderfulness of markets is not necessarily ‘for everyone’. This establishes that the 
field of P04’s expertise is not just in markets per se, but in the particular realm of 
experiencing markets.
However, in another respect P04’s response is similar to those provided by 
P03 and P05 in that he provides a description of his imagined experience which in 
other contexts could be heard as appropriately detailed by referencing a variety of 
features. But notwithstanding P04’s presentation of his response as an appropriately 
justified account, the researcher’s reiteration of questions about what P04 can see 
indicates that P04’s responses are being treated as not appropriately detailed. Given 
that P04 offers a somewhat lengthy description, this raises the question of the 
interactional relevance of the researcher’s repeated questioning of what is being seen. 
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One possibility is that the researcher is treating a number of elements in P04’s account 
as not ‘proper’ description such as his references to ‘When I look around I see people’ 
and ‘they are all in a hurry’. However, in other contexts similar phrases are apparently 
regarded as acceptable instances of description. For example, in one of the transcripts 
of healthy participants’ responses, the description provided includes phrases such as 
‘there is an atmosphere here of people moving in expectation’ and ‘there’s a buzz 
about the place’ (Hassabis et al, 2007, p. 1727) and these are apparently treated by the 
researcher as unexceptionable.
It is noteworthy that P04 relies on references to ‘magic’ and wonderfulness. In 
the first place, this indicates that the relevant features of markets are precisely those 
which are not readily captured by descriptions of what is seen, heard or smelt of the 
sort which are called for in the present task. In the second place, it indicates that only 
people who have the ability to experience these supernatural qualities are in a position 
to appreciate such descriptions. Taken together, these suggest that the experience of 
imagining oneself in a bustling street market requires abilities of a somewhat different 
kind than those involved in the task set. What this indicates is an absence of 
agreement between the researcher and the participant as to what constitutes a 
sufficient account of experience and the relevance of the task as experimentally 
designed.
4. Discussion
The process of reconsidering Hassabis et al.’s original data by means of discourse 
analyses techniques reveals that, from some perspectives, all three participants might 
be providing responses which in other contexts would be taken to be appropriately 
descriptive. The context of these interactions, however, is one in which participants 
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are being asked to provide a particular sort of description. In two of the cases, the 
participant and the researcher jointly work up these descriptions as being insufficient. 
In the third case, the participant acknowledges, towards the end of his account, that 
the description he is providing is in some sense problematic. In all three cases, 
therefore, within this particular context the participants apparently failed to 
successfully negotiate the task set for them.
So let us accept, for the moment, that the descriptions offered by the 
participants are in some way deficient. The question remains as to what it is that 
underlies this poverty in task performance. Content-based forms of analysis 
foreground the notion that a failure in task performance reflects acquired individual 
disabilities. However, the present analyses reveal that the evaluations of task 
performance which are generated within this experimental setting are the outcomes of 
a joint interactional process in which both participant and researcher play important 
roles. In each case, the failure does not necessarily seem solely to reflect an inability 
to provide details in response to the cue that is offered. It is not necessarily just the 
type of detail or its amount, but also the way in which it is delivered which is 
problematic. Information which is signalled as difficult will be treated as though it is 
difficult. And so the problematic status of these accounts is as much to do with failure 
to negotiate interactionally that the description being offered is an adequate one as it 
is to do with the quality of the description itself. Hence, the level of detail provided in 
itself does not necessarily signal an absence of scene construction. In part, it is the 
orientation of the interactants which marks it out as such. 
So the problematic status of these accounts arguably says as much about the 
participants’ and researchers’ orientations towards the task set as it says about the 
potential ability to construct scenes of these participants. What this means is that in 
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analyzing tasks of this sort, the researcher must take seriously the communicative 
nature of these task interactions. This is especially important in imagery studies of the 
sort examined here. The temptation in such studies is to regard verbal reports of 
introspection as providing some sort of ‘direct’ inference about processes in the mind 
or brain. However, what the present analyses foreground is the importance of 
understanding that even verbal reports of this sort may be generated within a 
communicative episode in which what is said is the outcome of a process of 
interaction between participant and researcher.
Another aspect of the present analyses is that they reveal features of the 
participants’ responses which are ignored by content-based forms of analysis. In 
particular, P03, P04 and P05 can all be seen to display a sophisticated understanding 
of the interactional requirements associated with ‘telling a story’. P03 and P05 include 
in their responses a variety of devices which orient to their descriptions as in some 
way inadequate. P04 carefully designs his account to achieve the opposite effect by 
including descriptive detail which highlights his expert understanding of the scene 
that is being described. In this way, all of the participants display a well-developed 
ability to attend to the interactional requirements of the current context. On the one 
hand, they frame their responses as responses to the research task. On the other hand, 
they display sensitivity to the issue of whether their descriptions are adequate as
descriptions.
This raises a further interesting point. Content-based analyses deal with the 
participants’ talk by treating it as means of measuring the presence or absence of 
specific cognitive ability: the ability to engage in ‘mental scene construction’.
However, an available alternative explanation in the present case is that what 
participants’ talk reveals is a relative inability to tell a story about what is being 
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imagined. On this alternative formulation, cognitive deficits which are instantiated in 
these participants might have as much to do with deficits in the ability to produce a 
story or narrative account as in the ability to inspect mental scenes (i.e. the relevant 
problem may be one of production rather than one of retrieval). It is, for example, 
interesting to note that Hassabis et al. report no significant differences among 
participants in the extent to which they report ‘sense of presence’ or ‘perceived 
salience’. If anything, this finding would seem to support the alternative hypothesis. 
This far, this paper has examined the extent to which content-based forms of 
analysis deal appropriately with the interactional data which are represented by the 
verbal descriptions jointly produced by participants and researchers. However, it is 
worthwhile briefly considering the other information, represented by quantitative 
scores, which were presented in the original paper. One noteworthy point here is that 
the participants’ own ‘spatial coherence’ scores and the ‘quality judgement’ scores 
provided by scorers were lower for the hippocampal damaged participants than for the 
healthy participants, However, this leaves open to question whether these scores were 
affected by the actual performance of the hippocampal participants, by the nature of 
the interactions in which those participants engaged, or some combination of these 
factors. For example, the process of measuring the spatial coherence scores was 
described by Hassabis et al. as one which was ‘blind to the purpose of the statements 
and indeed the concept of coherence’ (Hassabis et al, 2007, p. 1728). However, the 
statements which made up the index were of the form ‘I could see the whole scene in 
my mind’s eye’. In a context where hippocampal participants’ descriptions had 
already been worked-up as insufficient during their actual production, it would not be 
surprising to discover that this had an impact on the way they answered such 
questions. 
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The major focus of this paper has been on exploring the extent to which a 
multi-disciplinary approach to data analysis might offer anything of value to the 
researcher in this domain. It is important to note that what is not being suggested here 
is that researchers in clinical neuropsychology should not gather data of this sort. 
However, what the present study indicates is that researchers may well benefit from 
giving appropriate consideration to the interactional richness of this sort of data. 
These interactions are joint constructions, and this may influence both what is said 
and what is not said. For example, the ‘helpful prompts’ that follow on from open-
ended questions may not be taken up by the participants in the ways expected by the 
researcher. One useful focus for future multi-disciplinary research therefore would be 
to promote researchers’ awareness of the interactional aspects of these encounters. 
Such development might emphasise the possible ways in which any researcher 
prompts, even though designed to be helpful, might be subsequently taken up in the 
descriptions produced by participants with hippocampal lesions and by healthy 
control participants.
Of course in the present instance, the research participants involved in the 
interactions being considered had previously been identified as having hippocampal 
lesions. The analysts thus were not ‘blind’ to the source of the data. In a sense, it 
might be thought that the analytic task thereby becomes a simpler one in that the data 
are already marked out as being in some way different from data that would otherwise 
be produced. However, in such cases the challenge to the analyst becomes potentially 
even greater, requiring increased attention to the ways in which variations in the 
descriptions are found in the detail of the interactions. The potential risk of having 
participants ‘pre-categorized’ is that the analyst is mistakenly drawn away from the 
details of what is said to more general theorizing based on what is ‘known’ about 
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members of such categories. (For these reasons, future inter-disciplinary research in 
this area might consider the advantages of performing such analyses ‘blind’, 
especially in cases where such analyses are performed by those who are less 
experienced in the intricacies of discourse analysis.)
As is the case with fine-grained discourse analysis of any data, the analytic 
process can be a time-consuming one that requires extensive commitment on the part 
of the researcher. Moreover, as we discussed in the method section, this level of 
researcher engagement inevitably involves interpretation in order that the most useful 
analysis of the data can be offered. These issues are clearly relevant to the question of 
whether discourse analyses of the sort produced here are applicable in the domain of 
neuropsychological research. However, what we hope to have demonstrated here is 
that, even given the potential resource costs which may be involved, such analysis of 
the rich data that are routinely collected could pay dividends for the 
neuropsychological community.
Hassabis et al. point out that the differences between hippocampal participants 
and healthy participants can be ‘subtle in nature’ (Hassabis et al, 2007, p. 1728). This 
indicates that the employment of discourse analytic techniques, which rely upon a 
fine-grain analysis of the subtle features of verbal interaction, might usefully be 
employed in exploring these subtle differences both in the development of future 
general theoretical understandings and in the clinical setting.
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